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I. INTRODUCTION
Religion and religious symbols that are attributable to government expression can
be easily found in public places, forums, and venues. Religious affirmations are
spoken in our public schools every time the pledge of allegiance is recited to our
nation “under God.”1 Our national motto, “In God We Trust,” is displayed on every
piece of U.S. currency. Federal law has provided for the observance of a “National
Day of Prayer” since the time of the Constitutional framers.2 Chaplains, paid with
federal funds, are employed by our legislature. Even in our Supreme Court, a
religious painting of “Moses the Lawgiver” is displayed over the bench and
reverberates with the cry of “God save the United States and this Honorable Court”
at the opening of every session. These are just a few of a great many examples of
religion and religious ideas and symbols that seem to be a form of government
expression.
These expressions of religious themes and ideas are nothing new. Our nation was
founded on values which flow from a belief in a Supreme Being.3 The Declaration of
Independence speaks of all men being “created equal” and “endowed by their
Creator, with certain unalienable rights.”4 The First Congress urged the President to
declare “a day of public thanksgiving and prayer” to “Almighty God.”5 However,
these same men who honored the presence of religion in government were wary of
the type of church-state government against which they had just revolted. For
protection from such a government, the First Congress passed the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution barring Congress from making
any “law respecting the establishment of a religion.”6
With the prevalence of so many religious symbols, phrases and images in our
public forum, the obvious question that arises is: When do these religious
“expressions” violate the Establishment Clause? Judges, lawyers and scholars have
been trying to answer that question in a clear and authoritative way since the passage
of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has been
a “vortex of controversy” for decades.7 Disputes over its interpretation and
application arise over a wide variety of situations; from prayer in public schools to
nativity scenes and monuments on public land. The Supreme Court is in perpetual
disagreement over the interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause.

1
The Pledge of Allegiance was amended in 1954 to include the phrase “under God.” See
H.R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339. The
House Report states that “the inclusion of God in our pledge . . . acknowledges the
dependence of our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator.”
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2340.
2

36 U.S.C. 169h (1988).

3

ACLU v. Capitol Square Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184 (1998).

4

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

5

Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).

6

U.S. CONST. amend. I §1.

7

Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Paralellelism and the Establishment
Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763 (1993).
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The Court has adopted and abandoned various tests and settled on ambiguous and
flawed options.
The current battle over Ohio’s state motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,”
has brought the debate over the meaning and application of the Establishment Clause
to the Sixth Circuit and sparked deep feelings on both sides of the issue. The most
recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly held, using the
Lemon and endorsement tests, that Ohio’s state motto was an unconstitutional
violation of the Establishment Clause. The history and jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause support the government’s use of generalized, respectful
references to God, as found in the Ohio state motto. When properly applied, the Ohio
state motto passes both the Lemon and endorsement tests, even though these tests are
so fundamentally flawed that they ought to be abandoned in favor of the United
States Supreme Court’s original Establishment Clause test: the coercion analysis.
Part II of this Note will examine the history and jurisprudence surrounding the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This brief survey will reveal the
continuing disagreements over the interpretation and application of the
Establishment Clause while showing that history supports generalized references to
God by the federal and state government. Part III will introduce the background and
procedural history of the current case American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio v.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board,8 in which the Ohio state motto is being
attacked as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Part IV will briefly analyze the
Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and then apply each test to Ohio’s motto. The result of this discussion will show that
history, jurisprudence and logic support upholding Ohio’s state motto as
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE : OVERVIEW AND ARGUMENTS OF
INTERPRETATION
The current battle over Ohio’s state motto starts with the perpetual battle over the
meaning or “the original intent” of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment
Clause makes up the first ten words of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, . . .”9 The next six words, “or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” are referred to as the Free Exercise Clause.10
Together, these clauses are known as “the religion clauses.”
On their face, these clauses express two concerns: “the prohibition of an
establishment of religion and the guarantee of the free exercise of religion.”11 These
clauses also express “a tradition of freedom of religious exercise and a tradition of
freedom from religious exercise.”12
8

ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.

9

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

10

Id.

11

DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT 46 (1991).

12

Jonathan K. Van Patten, The Partisan Battle Over the Constitution: Meese’s
Jurisprudence of Original Intention and Brennan’s Theory of Contemporary Ratification, 70
MARQ. L. REV., 391-92 (1987).
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Most debate over the framers’ intent in the wording of the religion clauses
focuses on the Establishment Clause.13 The only point on which there is full
agreement is the fact that the Establishment Clause was intended to ban the
establishment of a state church or religion.14 The purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause is relatively clear compared to that of the Establishment Clause. In the words
of John Locke, the Free Exercise Clause was intended to preserve the rights of a
citizen to believe “according to the dictates of his own Conscience,” free from civil
coercion.15
Generally speaking, the Establishment Clause is interpreted in one of two
mutually exclusive ways: the narrow interpretation or the broad interpretation.16 The
narrow interpretation, favored by those who have been labeled as “accomodationists”
and “nonpreferentalists,”17 “holds that the framers intended for the Establishment
Clause to prevent governmental establishment of a single sect or denomination of
religion above others.”18 Extreme accomodationists hold that the clause bans only the
establishment of a state church or religion.19 A “nonpreferentialist,” a less extreme
subset of “accomodationists,” believes that government may assist religion in a
variety of ways as long as such aid is imparted without discrimination; that is, if the
government support does not favor one denomination or sect over others.20 Those
who hold to this narrow view conclude that the framers “intended only to remove
religious requirements for public office, prevent the creation of a national church or
religion, protect freedom of conscience in matters of religion against invasion by the
national government, and leave the states to deal with questions of religion as they
saw fit.”21 Robert Cord, a prominent scholar who subscribes to the accomodationist
point of view, writes:
There appears to be no historical evidence that the First Amendment was
intended to preclude Federal government aid to religion when it was
provided on a non-discriminatory basis. Nor does there appear to be any

13

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 46.

14

Id.

15

John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1685), reprinted in MAIN CURRENTS OF
WESTERN THOUGHT, ed. Franklin Le Van Baumer, 4th ed. (1978), 355.
16
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 43 (James
E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985).
17

LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 91 (1986).

18

DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48.

19

Thomas Peters, Bnet: Overview of Church and State Separation Debate, (Jan. 5, 2001)
available at <http://thomasash.hypermart.net/bnet/items/00022.html>.
20

See LEVY, supra note 17, at 91.

21

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 49.
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historical evidence that the First Amendment was intended to provide an
absolute separation or independence of religion and the national state.22
These nonpreferentialist views, and especially the view that there is “no wall of
separation” between the church and the state, are shared by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, William Rhenquist. He writes in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree:23
It would seem that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had
acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national
religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or
denominations. . . . The Establishment Clause did not require neutrality
between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the federal government
from providing non-discriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no
historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build
the ‘wall of separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson. . . . The
‘wall of separation between church and state’ is a metaphor based on bad
history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.24
Other cited proponents of the nonpreferentialist view today include Supreme Court
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, and in the past included John Cotton
and Patrick Henry.25
In contrast to the narrow view that the First Amendment bans only the
establishment of a state church and preferential treatment between religious sects,26
the broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause, also known as the
“separationist” or “no aid” approach, holds that there is a strict “wall of separation”
between government and religion.27 The separationist believes the First Amendment
prohibits the government from having anything to do with religion and claims that
“no church or religious group should receive any form of governmental aid.”28 This
broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause was first advanced in 1947 by
Justice Hugo Black in the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education.29 Justice
Black, writing for a five-to-four majority stated that:
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion over another. Neither can
22
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 15 (1982).
23

472 U.S. 38 (1985).

24

DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, VOL. II, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES 701 (1991).
25

Larry Pahl, Establishing the History of the Establishment Clause, (Jan. 5, 2001),
available at <http://members.aol.com/LarryPahl/estab1.htm>.
26

Peters, supra note 19.

27

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48.

28

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48.

29

330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also DAVIS, supra 11, at 47.
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force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by laws was
intended to erect a ‘wall of separation between church and State.’30
The separationists generally believe that the “First Amendment was intended to
reaffirm that the Constitution granted no power to the federal government over
religion.”31 Separationists hold that government support of any religious belief or
practice is a violation of the First Amendment, even if such promotion favors no
particular sect or religion.32 Their interpretation of the First Amendment is said to be
an outgrowth of the views held by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.33
Separationists often cite Jefferson’s 1779 “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom”,
Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation” metaphor in an 1802 letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association of Connecticut, and Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance.”34
Even though the narrow and broad interpretations of the Establishment Clause
are in disagreement, both sides make arguments citing the framers’ original intent.
Both the separationist and the accomadationist may argue that the framers’ original
intent supports their position because unclear and often incomplete records make the
framers’ original intent very difficult to ascertain.35 In addition, examination of the
history often reveals varying purposes behind the Amendment.36 Clues into the
framers’ actual intent can be found upon a brief examination of the political
atmosphere at the time of the ratification of the Establishment Clause, the legislative
history of the Establishment Clause, and the action taken by the original framers
after the institution of the Establishment Clause.
A. Federalism and the Establishment Clause
It has been well established that the states, at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution and its Amendments, jealously guarded their sovereign rights and were
very suspicious of federal authority.37 This is clearly seen in the Constitution’s
30

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).

31

See Peters, supra note 19.

32

Id.

33

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48.

34

See Pahl, supra note 25; 16 Const. Comm 627, 1.

35

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 50.

36

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §14-3 (1978).

37

Tom Peters, Bnet: What the founders believed about separation of church and state (Jan
5, 2001) <http://thomasash.hypermart.net/bnet/items/00024.htm>.
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provision for a national government of strictly delegated, limited, and enumerated
powers.38 Those matters not entrusted to the federal government were reserved by the
states.39 This mode of political organization which unites independent states within a
larger political framework, while still allowing each state to maintain its own
political framework, is known as “federalism.”40 In the words of scholar Mark
Dewolfe Howe, the Constitution, “made national disability the rule and national
power the exception.”41 Because affirmative power in the religious sphere had not
been delegated to the national government in the Constitution, “it was acknowledged
that authority over religious matters was not extended to the federal regime, and the
states were free to maintain their own church-state arrangements and policies.”42
When the proposed constitution was being considered by the state-ratifying
conventions, there was a strong fear that its “centralizing tendencies would crush the
rights of states and individuals.”43 Because of this fear, and in an attempt to secure
certain liberties, many states agreed to accept the new document only if a Bill of
Rights was included.44 The religious clauses of the First Amendment which imposed
restrictions specifically on “Congress,” affirmed by implication that the states
retained the power to determine their own church-state policies within their
jurisdictions.45
The separationist would argue from these facts that the framers believed that the
national government and religion are completely separate and that Congress was
powerless to enact laws that aided religion, even in the absence of the First
Amendment.46 The nonpreferentialist would argue that these facts simply emphasize
that the framers’ main motivation behind the First Amendment was to prohibit a
church-state government.
B. The Wording of the Establishment Clause
James Madison did not want to add a bill of rights to the Constitution and argued
that such an addition was unnecessary.47 He agreed with the words of Alexander
Hamilton in the Federalist: “For why declare the things that shall not be done which
38

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

39

Id.; James Madison observed that “the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite. . . .” THE FEDERALIST 45, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
288, 292-3 (1961).
40

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 1994, vol. 4, p.712.

41

MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 19-20 (1965).
42

Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas
Jefferson’s “wall of Separation” Metaphor, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 627, 650 (1999).
43

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 52.

44

Id. at 53.

45

See Dreisbach, supra note 42, at 649.

46

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 52.

47

Id. at 53.
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there is no power to do?”48 However, because many states had ratified the new
Constitution with the understanding that there would be forthcoming amendments to
safeguard certain human and state rights from encroachment by the national
government, Madison felt “bound in honor” to propose a Bill of Rights.49 The first
version of the amendment was introduced by Madison to the House of
Representatives in 178950 and read:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on the account of religious
belief, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and
equal rights of conscience in any manner or any pretext be infringed.51
Proponents of a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause view the use
of the word “national” as proof that Madison simply intended a prohibition against
forming a state church.52 However, proponents of the broad view would point out
that only a few years earlier, Madison spoke out against a bill in the Virginia
legislature “calling for the general tax assessment for the support of, not one, but all
Christian [sects].”53 He later referred to this bill as “an establishment of religion.”54
What is agreed, is that it is difficult to know just what Madison meant by prohibiting
the establishment of a “national religion.”
The word “national” was quickly edited out of the proposal by the House
subcommittee; and after many other proposals and much debate, the House approved
the following broader amendment: “Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience.”55
The Senate began debates, conducted in secrecy, on the House Amendments on
September 3, 1789.56 The only record of these debates that exists is the sparse
account of motions and votes in the Senate Journal.57 According to that record, three
alternatives to the House amendment were proposed and defeated.58 Each of these
defeated “motions restricted the ban in the proposed amendment to establishments
48

THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 at 481 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

49

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); reprinted in Kurland and Lerner, THE
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, 5: Bill of Rights, No. 11, 21-32.
50

See Peters, supra note 37.

51

See supra note 49, at 434.

52

See DAVIS, supra note 11 at 55.

53

8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 298-306 (Robert A. Rutland, ed., 1976).

54

Id.

55

See Peters, supra note 37.

56

See LEVY, supra note 17, at 81.

57

Id. at 82.

58

The three proposed and defeated amendments were as follows: “Congress shall make no
law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others,” “Congress shall not
make any law infringing the rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society,”
“Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in
preference to another.” Id.
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preferring one sect above others.”59 Instead, the Senate adopted the broader language
of the House: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion.” Some have argued
that this proves “that the Senate intended something broader than merely a ban on
preference to a sect.”60 However, the Senate altered the Amendment six days later;
the alteration which, like the previously defeated motions, “had the unmistakable
meaning of limiting the ban to acts that prefer one denomination over others or that,
to put it simply, established a single state church.”61 It read: “Congress shall make no
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free
exercise of religion. . . .”62 The Senate’s narrow version of the Amendment was then
sent to the House where it was rejected.63
Because the House and the Senate had approved different versions of the Bill of
Rights, a conference committee was proposed to resolve the differences.64 On
September 25, 1789, a compromise Amendment was agreed upon which stated:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.”65 The committee left no records of their deliberations.66
What little record that is available of the deliberations behind the drafting of the
Establishment Clause only adds to the confusion over its meaning. Both narrow and
broad proposed amendments were debated and rejected. As has been shown, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment can be interpreted both ways.
However, a brief look at the actions taken by the framers after its passage may shed
some light on its true meaning.
C. The Actions of the Original Framers of the Establishment Clause
Studying how those who drafted the Establishment Clause used and applied the
Amendment is one of the best ways to determine their intent in its passage. The
actions of the framers of the Establishment Clause do not comply with the
separationists claim that the Amendment was intended “to create a state of complete
independence between religion and government.”67 Instead, the actions of the
framers reveal a government that both tolerates and embraces the presence of
religion.
One of the most blatant examples of the framers’ acknowledgment of religious
ideas in government lies in the fact that the first House of Representatives proposed
the Establishment Clause one day and then proposed a Presidential proclamation of

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

See LEVY, supra note 17, at 82.

62

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1:166 (Linda Grant DePauw, ed. 1971).
63

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 60

64

See LEVY, supra note 17, at 83.

65

See supra note 48, at 913.

66

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 60.

67

See CORD, supra note 22, at 50
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“Thanksgiving and Prayer” the very next day.68 President George Washington’s first
“National Thanksgiving Proclamation” acknowledges “the providence of Almighty
God” and calls for the people of the United States to offer “prayers and supplications
to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations.”69 Many of those who voted for the First
Amendment apparently saw no conflict with the Thanksgiving Day Proclamation
and voted for its passage.70 Even Madison himself did not object to the resolution
requesting the Thanksgiving Day Proclamation.71 In fact, he issued at least four
proclamations calling for a day of “public thanksgiving and prayer” during his
presidency.72 These do not seem like the actions of men who intended the complete
separation of government and religion.
Another example lies in the existence of chaplains in both the Continental
Congress and the First Congress. Again, Madison was a member of the
Congressional Committee that recommended that Congressional Chaplains be
elected.73 The First Congress also authorized the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint a chaplain for “Military Establishments of the
United States.”74 This statute was advanced by the Second and Third Congresses.75
Clues into the original framers’ view of the relationship between religion and the
government can also be seen in some of this nation’s earliest treaties with the Native
Americans. The Establishment Clause did not stop Jefferson from providing money
to build a church and other religious needs to the Kaskaskia Indians in an 1803
treaty.76 Other early American presidents who joined Jefferson in committing federal
money to build churches through treaty agreements include George Washington,
James Monroe, Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.77 Federal money was also
used to support religion, missionary teachers, and church schools in a campaign “to
civilize” the Native Americans.78 Although it may be argued that these events were
merely the product of the culture at that time, if the Establishment Clause was meant
to prohibit the national government from having anything to do with religion, then its
original framers surely violated their own intentions with their actions. It is logical to
conclude from these actions taken by the framers of the First Amendment that the

68

Id. at 51.

69

JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 1:64 (1901).
70

See CORD, supra note 22, at 51.

71

See supra note 49, at 949-50.

72

See CORD, supra note 22, at 53.

73

Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, First Sess. Of the Thirty Third
Congress, in three vols., (A.O.P. Nicholson, Printer. 1854), Vol. II, House of Representatives
Document 124.
74

See CORD, supra note 22, at 54.

75

Id.

76

LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM, 67-79 (rev. ed. 1967).

77

See CORD, supra note 22, at 59.

78

Id. at 63.
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Establishment Clause was not intended to completely separate religion and
government.
D. The Supreme Court’s Working Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
While the debate still rages over the meaning of the Establishment Clause, a
working line of jurisdictional precedent has been established. In order to determine
whether the Ohio State Motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” violates the
Establishment Clause, it is important to look to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
with respect to this issue. An examination of these cases will reveal that although a
few tests find general acceptance, the Supreme Court is deeply divided over how to
apply the Establishment Clause to government action that expresses or affirms
religion.79
While earlier Establishment Clause cases were heard by the Supreme Court,
Everson v. Board of Education80 is generally considered to be “the first case . . . in
which the Court really came to grips with the question of applying the First
Amendment’s [E]stablishment [C]lause.”81 In this case, Everson, a district taxpayer,
challenged a New Jersey statute which authorized the reimbursement of
transportation expenses to parents of children in both parochial and public schools.82
Everson argued that the statute forced him to help support and maintain schools
dedicated to the Catholic Faith and was, therefore, a “law respecting an
establishment of religion.”83 The Court found that the statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause and held that state or federal government practice could neither
“force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”84 The Court also held
that “[n]o person [could] be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.”85 The form of analysis used
by the Court here has come to be known as the “coercion analysis.”86 This mode of
analysis, influenced by the writings of Madison and Jefferson, “require[s] a specific
finding of government coercion for a state or federal practice to be considered a
violation of the Establishment Clause.”87
Under the coercion analysis,
“[g]overnment must have coerced or compelled an individual to religious practice or
belief for a constitutional violation to have occurred.”88 In Everson, the Court held
79

E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183,
1185 (1994).
80

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

81

M. GLENN ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 173 (6th ed. 1992).

82

Everson, 330 U.S. at 1, 5.

83

Id. at 8.

84

Id. at 15-16.

85

Id.

86

Kristen J. Graham, Comment: The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle as the Touchstone
of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REV 147 (1994).
87

Id. at 149.

88

Id.
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that to strike down the statute and to disallow transportation for children attending
parochial schools, would both allow the government to, in effect, “force [students]
. . . to remain away from church against [their] will” and punish taxpaying citizens
“for entertaining or professing religious beliefs.”89 The Supreme Court continued to
use the coercion analysis in questions of religious establishment in the years
following Everson.90
In the 1962 case Engel v. Vitale,91 the Court began to reject the coercion analysis,
the basis on which prior case law in this area had been decided. The Court, in dicta,
eliminated the coercion analysis from its Establishment Clause jurisprudence stating:
[T]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether [the] laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or
not.92
One year after Engel, in Abington School District v. Schempp,93 the Court again
rejected the coercion analysis, declaring that “a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so
attended.”94 Because Engel diverted from the precedent of the coercion analysis, the
Court began to develop new ideas and theories in Establishment Clause doctrine that
would ultimately be combined to create a new test.
The issue set before the Court in Schempp was whether a state could statutorily
require Bible readings or recitations of the Lord’s prayer in public school
classrooms.95 The Court found that this law required religious exercise and was
therefore a violation of the Establishment Clause based on the concept of strict
neutrality.96 The Court explained this concept by declaring that the “[g]overnment
[must] maintain strict neutrality [by] neither aiding nor opposing religion.”97 Writing
for the majority, Justice Clark wrote that this “neutrality” stems from the historical
fear of a state-church and stated that the Establishment Clause mandates that all
legislation must have a secular purpose and a “primary effect” that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.98 However, Justice Goldberg warned in his concurring opinion

89

Id. at 156 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16)..

90

See Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see also,
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
91

370 U.S. 421 (1962).

92

Id. at 430.

93

374 U.S. 203 (1963).

94

Id. at 223.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 225.

97

Id.

98

The test is: “what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
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that the concept of neutrality could be taken too far when he stated that “untutored
devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to . . . a brooding and pervasive
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious” which
is “not only not compelled by the Constitution but . . . [is] prohibited by it.”99
A few years later the Court in Waltz v. Tax Commissioner100 expounded on the
test in Schempp by adding a third component: that the “end result,” or “effect’ of the
legislation, “is not an excessive government entanglement with religion.”101 These
three components were formally articulated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman102
and have come to be known as the “Lemon test.”103 The Court very clearly articulated
this three-pronged test based on the previously discussed cases: “First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; Second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [Third], the statute must not foster
‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”104 The Court clarified the
application of the Lemon test in Stone v. Graham105 when it said that “[i]f a statute
violates any of these three principles, it must be struck down under the Establishment
Clause.”106
Although the Lemon test has been widely used and accepted as the test to
determine violations of the Establishment Clause, it has also been criticized by
scholars, lawyers and even Justices of the Supreme Court.107 Application of the
Lemon test has been called “unclear and unpredictable” because of its fluctuating
meaning.108 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree109 stated that the Lemon
test “has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the wall
theory upon which it rests.”110 In Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,111
Justice Kennedy wrote that he did “not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.” Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
99

Id. at 306.

100

397 U.S. 664 (1970).

101

Id. at 674.

102

403 U.S. 602 (1971).

103

Id.

104

Id. at 612-13.

105

449 U.S. 39 (1980).

106

Id. at 39-40.

107

See Graham, supra note 85, at 165.

108

Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L. REP.1, 3
(1992). Franklin says that “[t]he literal language of Lemon has remained intact but the
meaning attached to each of the three test questions has fluctuated depending on which Justice
wrote the Court’s decision.” Id. at 2.
109

472 U.S. 38 (1985).

110

Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to Madison’s “wall of separation.”).

111

492 U.S. 573 (1989).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

13

762

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:749

adopting, [the Lemon] test as [the] primary guide in this difficult area.”112 Justice
Scalia has likened the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie” which
“after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.”113 As many as five of the Justices currently sitting on the Supreme
Court have, in their own opinions, criticized Lemon and a sixth has joined an opinion
doing so.114
In order to eliminate the Lemon test’s “tendenc[y] toward subjectivity and
formalism,” Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v. Donnely115 proposed a
modification to Lemon that has come to be known as the “endorsement test.”116 In
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
“making adherence to religion relevant, in reality or in public perception, to [a
person’s] standing in the political community.”117 She believes “what is crucial is
that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”118 The test of whether a
governmental act actually does endorse a religion was clarified by Justice O’Connor
in Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinnette119 when she stated that the
question to ask is whether a “reasonable observer” would perceive the government
practice as endorsing religion.120
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test was met with approval from those who saw
the need to modify the Lemon test.121 However, it, too, has met with much criticism.
112

Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

113

Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993); See
also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 613 (Scalia dissenting). Justice Scalia writes: “In the
past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the
ground that it ‘sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility.’ … I think it time that we
sacrifice some ‘flexibility’ for ‘clarity and predictability.’ Abandoning Lemon’s purpose test
. . . would be a good place to start.” Id. at 639-40.
114

See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718-21 (1994); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 644 (1992); Allegheny, 462 U.S. at 655-57; Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 573 (1989); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107-113;
Sch. Dist. Of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985). Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 282 (1981); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134-135 (1977); Justice
White stated in Roemer v. Board of Public Works: “I am no more reconciled now to Lemon
. . . than I was when it was decided. . . . The threefold test of Lemon…imposes unnecessary,
and . . . superfluous tests for establishing ‘when the State’s involvement with religion passes
the peril point’ for First Amendment purposes.” 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring).
115

465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Lynch majority upheld a creche display as constitutional
because of the holiday environment in which it was displayed.
116

Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the Establishment
Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1770 (1993).
117

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.

118

Id.

119

515 U.S. 753; 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).

120

Id. at 777 (O’Conner, J., concurring).

121

See Graham, supra note 86, at 168.
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One of the major criticisms is the difficulty of defining “endorsement.” The concept
of having an Establishment Clause violation based on the “reasonable observer’s”
perception of endorsement “ultimately depends on the eye of the beholder.”122 “For
this reason, ‘endorsement’ cannot be defined in a way that is both generally
acceptable and useful.”123 Justice O’Connor has distinguished permissible
“acknowledgements” of religion from “endorsement,” but most of the widely
accepted usages she mentioned seem to be more than a mere acknowledgement of
religion.124
Although the Lemon test and the endorsement test have serious ambiguities and
problems, they are still being used today. However, some have argued that the
Supreme Court is showing signs of moving back to the coercion analysis. Justice
Kennedy “revitalized” the coercion analysis, which had been neglected by the Court
for so many years, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.125 He
stated that “[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive
or symbolic accommodation is minimal.”126 Kennedy’s statement reveals a view that
coercion is of primary importance in determining Establishment Clause violations.
Just as separationists and nonpreferentialists are in disagreement about how to
define the Establishment Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court is in disagreement about
how to apply the Establishment Clause. Interpretation and application of the
Establishment Clause seems to be as organic as the Constitution itself. Generally
speaking, most courts today will look to the Lemon test or to the endorsement test to
determine if a violation of the Establishment Clause has occurred. Such was the case
in determining whether the Ohio state motto constitutes a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
III. THE OHIO STATE MOTTO CASE: ACLU v. CAPITAL SQUARE REVIEW &
ADVISORY BD.
A. Background
In 1865, the General Assembly of Ohio adopted the motto “Imperium in
Imperio” which is Latin for “An empire within an empire.”127 However, the motto
was repealed two years later because it “smacked too much of royalty.”128 Ohio was
without a motto for 90 years until a Cincinnati school boy, troubled that the state of
Ohio was without a motto, suggested that the state adopt the phrase “With God all

122

See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1220.

123

Id.

124

A few of the examples of “permissible acknowledgments of religion” mentioned by
Justice O’Connor include the national motto “In God We Trust” and opening Court sessions
with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.” Id.
125

492 U.S. 573 (1989).

126

Id. at 662.

127

ACLU, 20 F.Supp. 2d at 1178.

128

Id.
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Things Are Possible,” drawn from Matthew 19:26.129 On October 1, 1959 the phrase
was adopted as the official state motto by an Act of the General Assembly of Ohio.130
Later, a distinctive design was created which portrayed the motto inscribed on a
ribbon-like device and combined with the state seal.131 Since the motto’s adoption, it
has been used by the state and state officials in a variety of ways.132
In May of 1996, then-Governor George Voinovich recommended to the Capital
Square Advisory Board that the state motto be inscribed on the grounds of the
Capitol Square.133 Governor Voinovich was inspired to make this recommendation
after a trip to India where he observed the use of the motto “Government Work Is
God’s Work” inscribed on a public building. In December of 1996, the Board voted
unanimously to engrave the state seal and motto on a granite plaza at the west
entrance of the statehouse.134 On July 31, 1997, The American Civil Liberties Union
of Ohio, Inc. [hereinafter referred to as “the ACLU”] and the Reverend Matthew
Peterson filed an action against the Capital Square Advisory Board, Governor
Voinovich, Secretary of State Bob Taft, Tax Commissioner Roger W. Tracy, Senator
Richard H. Finan and two Capital Square officials.135 The ACLU sought “a
declaratory judgment declaring the Ohio state motto unconstitutional and a
permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from displaying the motto on the
Capital Square Plaza and from using it in any official way in the future.”136
B. District Court Decision
On September 1, 1998, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio denied the ACLU’s request to declare the Ohio state motto unconstitutional
or enjoin the defendants from displaying the motto.137 However, the Court did enjoin
the state from attributing the words of the motto to the text of the Christian New
Testament.138
The court came to this conclusion for many reasons. First, the court did not agree
with the Plaintiff’s argument that because Ohio’s motto is taken directly from the

129
Matthew 19:24-26. ‘Again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of
a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.’ When the disciples heard {this,}
they were very astonished and said, ‘Then who can be saved?’. And looking at {them} Jesus
said to them, ‘With people this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.’" (New
American Standard)
130

OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 506(5) (Anderson 1959).

131

ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.

132

Brief of Defendant-Appellees at 4, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and

Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000) (No.98-4106).
133

ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 1177

136

Id. at 1178

137

Id. at 1185.

138

ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
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words of Jesus Christ in the Christian New Testament, it is sectarian and endorses
the Christian religion over other religions.139 The court stated that “removed from
their . . . New Testament context, the words of the motto do not suggest a
denominational preference” as they “do not state a principle unique to
Christianity.”140 Second, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the motto
constitutes a governmental preference of religion over nonreligion, which violates
the Establishment Clause.141 The court relied heavily on Marsh v. Chambers,142
which held that certain “acknowledgment[s] of religion . . . regarded as part of the
‘fabric of our society’ are permitted by the Constitution.”143 The court, citing many
examples such as our national motto “In God We Trust” and the language “One
Nation Under God” in the pledge of allegiance, found that Ohio’s state motto was
both “embedded in [the] history and tradition of this country” and was a
constitutional acknowledgment of religion.144
The district court also concluded that this case is, like Marsh, an exception to the
rule of Lemon v. Kurtzman.145 The Court noted that even if the Lemon test did apply
to this case, the result would not change, because the motto passes all three prongs of
the Lemon test. The district court also concluded that Ohio’s motto passes Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test because the motto fits into the category of
“acknowledgments” of religion.146 The district court noted from a historical
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that it is proper for the federal government
to acknowledge religion in various ways.147
C. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the district court and the case was argued
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on November 4,
1999.148 The decision that came down five months later reversed the decision of the
district court and remanded it for entry of a permanent injunction enjoining the state
of Ohio and its agents from using the words “With God All Things Are Possible” as
the official state motto.149 This court disagreed with the district court’s view that in
determining whether there is a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Ohio state
motto should be viewed out of the context of the Christian New Testament from
139

Id. at 1178.

140

Id. at 1179.

141

Id. at 1183.

142

463 U.S. 783 (1983).

143

Id. ACLU, 20 F. Supp.2d at 1180 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792
(1983)).
144

ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.

145

403 U.S. 602 (1971); ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.

146

ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.

147

Id. at 1184.

148

ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000).

149

Id. at 727.
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which it is drawn.150 The court cited many cases which stress the importance of using
context to determine the meaning of words.151 The Court of Appeals interpreted the
words of Jesus used for the Ohio state motto as “explaining to [the disciples] what
was needed of them to enter heaven and achieve salvation.”152 They held that, viewed
in that context, the “reasonable observer” of the endorsement test would see an
advancement of the Christian religion and a violation of the Establishment Clause.153
The court also felt that the words of the motto, interpreted this way, violate the
second prong of the Lemon test in that the motto “advances the Christian religion.”154
Consequently, the court determined that Ohio’s state motto was unconstitutional.
However, a majority of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit later voted to rehear this case en banc.155 Under Sixth Circuit Rule
35(a) the effect of this hearing en banc will be to vacate their previous opinion and
judgment and to restore the case on the docket sheet as a pending appeal.156 The en
banc hearing took place on December 6, 2000, and the decision of the court is still
pending.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND HOW
IT AFFECTS THE OHIO STATE MOTTO
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals finding Ohio’s state motto
unconstitutional is based on a misapplication of the faulty tests that have been
accepted under the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause. The Lemon and the
endorsements tests generally used by the courts to determine violations of the
Establishment Clause should be abandoned. However, Ohio’s state motto is found to
be constitutional under the First Amendment of the Establishment Clause even when
these problematic tests are properly applied.
A. Strict Neutrality: The Illusory Foundation of the Lemon Test
The Lemon test should not be used to determine whether the motto of the state of
Ohio is a violation of the Establishment Clause and should be abandoned all
together. As stated above, the concept of “strict neutrality” is the basis behind the
first two prongs of the Lemon test.157 Secular speech is considered “neutral,” if “it
favors neither theism nor atheism and encourages neither belief nor disbelief.”158
150

Id. at 724.

151

Id.

152

Id. at 725.

153

ACLU, 210 F.3d at 727.

154

Id.

155

ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 222 F.3d 268, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16276 (6th Cir. Jul. 14, 2000).
156

Id.

157

The Lemon test states that “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, it’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster (an excessive government entanglement with religion).”
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
158

See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1191.
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Therefore, to a “strict neutralitist,” a complete ban on religious speech and
symbolism is seen not as a discrimination against religion but as “proper treatment”
under the Establishment Clause.159
There are two main problems with this “strict neutrality” view of the
Establishment Clause upon which the Lemon test is based. First, as has been shown
above, the history and wording of the Establishment Clause demonstrates that it was
never meant to create a purely secular state.160 The founders forbade government, not
from making any law “advancing religion” or even “respecting religion,” but only
from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”161 Further, the
Establishment Clause does not specifically forbid official expression of religious
ideas or symbolism that do not reach the level of an “establishment.”162 Indeed, the
actions of the framers discussed above, expressed religious ideas and sentiments in
many facets of the government. The Ohio state motto fits into such historically
accepted general references to God.
Second, the claim of neutrality is “illusory because secular or nonreligious
speech is not always ‘neutral’ toward religion.”163 To prohibit religious speech in any
facet of the government in favor of secular speech would privilege an atheistic view
of reality over a religious or theistic view of reality because the atheist and agnostic
must necessarily speak in secular terms.164 “Secular language need not be openly
antagonistic toward religion to conflict with it; it need only affirm the contrary.”165
For example, a public school science teacher may not openly teach religious views
on the origin of the universe and the beginning of life, but the secular perspective on
the subject (the only perspective a public school teacher is allowed to teach) is
irreconcilable with the tenets of many religious groups.166 Therefore “to mandate
‘official agnosticism,’ . . . is not necessarily to mandate ‘official neutrality’ between
theism and atheism.”167 As Walter Mobley puts it:
[I]t is a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach nothing
about it. On the contrary you teach that it is to be omitted, and that it is
therefore a matter of secondary importance. And you teach this not openly

159

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
199 (1992).
160

See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1192.

161

U.S. CONST. amend. I. § 1.

162

Id.

163

See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1192.

164

Id. at 1195.

165

Id.

166
In his concurrence in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, Justice Jackson
expressed his reservations about whether it was possible or desirable “completely to isolate
and cast out of secular education all that some people may reasonably regard as religious
instruction” because “nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which
gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences.” 333 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1948).
167

Wallace, supra note 79, at 1195.
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and explicitly . . . [but] insinuate it silently, insidiously, and all but
irresistibly.168
The point of this discussion is, in the words of scholar E. George Wallace, “not that
secularization of the public order [in the name of strict neutrality] is wrong because it
amounts to an establishment of a secular ‘religion.’ Rather, it is wrong because it
allows the state to disregard or disparage religion, but not to speak favorably of it.”169
This is not true neutrality nor the kind that was intended to be promoted by the
Establishment Clause. Therefore, because the first two prongs of the Lemon test are
based on the illusory concept of strict neutrality, the test should be abandoned and
not be used to determine whether the Ohio state motto violates the Establishment
Clause.
B. The Ohio State Motto Under the Lemon Test
Although the Supreme Court has pointed out some of these major flaws in the
Lemon test170 and has stated that it is not the exclusive test or criterion in
Establishment Clause cases,171 it is still often used by courts in Establishment Clause
cases. But even when Ohio’s state motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” is
applied to Lemon, it passes all three prongs of the test.
First, the motto of the state of Ohio, “With God All Things Are Possible,” clearly
has a secular purpose as required by the first prong of the Lemon test. As stated by
the district court, citing the Defendant’s memorandum in ACLU v. Capital Square,
“[The Ohio state motto] inculcates hope, makes Ohio unique, solemnizes occasions,
and acknowledges the humility that government leaders frequently feel in grappling
with difficult public policy issues.”172 The Supreme Court says that such a
“government assertion of a legitimate secular purpose is entitled to deference”173 and
that it is “reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States” on the first
prong of the Lemon test.174 For these reasons, the motto of the state of Ohio easily
passes the Lemon’s prong.
Ohio’s motto passes the second prong of Lemon in that it does not have the
primary effect of advancing religion. Acknowledgments of the generalized presence
of God have been historically embraced by the federal government, have been
upheld under the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, and do not primarily
advance religion.175 As has been shown above such acknowledgments of God are
168

Id. at 1200 (citing WALTER MOBLEY, THE CRISIS IN THE UNIVERSITY 56 (1949)).

169

See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1199.

170

At least five members of the Supreme Court have criticized the Lemon decision. See
supra note 110.
171

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.

172
20 F. Supp 2d 1176 at 1182 (citing Memorandum Contra Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 21).
173

Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997).

174

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1308 (1998).

175

Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1211
(1996).
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“deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country”.176 The Ohio state
motto, is consistent with the national tradition of making respectful references to
God and does not primarily advance religion. The example most applicable to the
Ohio motto case is found in the accepted Constitutional acknowledgment of God in
the United States national motto, “In God We Trust.”177 Each time the
constitutionality of the national motto has been challenged, it has been found to be
acceptable under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.178 In the most
recent case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the statutes establishing the use of the
national motto “easily meet the requirements of the Lemon test.”179 The national
motto and the Ohio state motto are very similar. Both mottos can be found in the
Bible. The Ohio state motto comes from Matthew 19:26 and the national motto can
be found in Psalms 16:1 and Psalms 56:11.180 Both mottos mention God, but the
national motto speaks to how we, as American people, relate to God and implies
something about God’s trustworthiness. The Ohio state motto simply makes a
statement about God. Dr. Thomas P. Kasulis, Chair of the Division of Comparative
Studies at The Ohio State University, put it another way when he testified before the
district court that the words of the U.S. motto suggests a shared national faith that all
Americans accept, while the Ohio motto is a mere “statement about God, not about
. . . how we should feel about God.”181 If the national motto, which speaks to the way
Americans relate to God, does not have as its primary effect the advancement of
religion, then neither does the Ohio state motto, which merely makes a statement
about God. The national motto is no more “neutral” between theism and atheism
than is the Ohio state motto. This is even more evidence that the Establishment
Clause does not require strict neutrality between a religious and agnostic viewpoints.
The national motto, along with the pledge of allegiance, legislative prayers, and
many of the other examples of generalized governmental references to God and
religion mentioned previously, do not primarily advance religion and do not violate
the Establishment Clause. The Ohio state motto is such an accepted, generalized
reference to God.
The Ohio motto also passes the third prong of the Lemon test in that it does not
foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. Those who would
say that the motto constitutes an excessive entanglement suggest that the motto
creates “the involvement of government in Christian theology.”182 However, as
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discussed above, generic references to “God” have long been held constitutional and
“accepted as both a reflection of the nation’s religious heritage, and as a means of
inspiring and uniting citizens professing a multitude of faiths.”183 The phrase “With
God All Things Are Possible” is not unique to the Christian religion alone. Some
religious authorities have gone so far as to say that virtually all religions
acknowledge a similar power in their god or gods.184 Statements similar to Ohio’s
motto can be found in most of the world’s major religions. Under Judaism, the writer
of Genesis asks “Is there anything too hard for the Lord?”185; and Job says of his God
that “Thou canst do all things.”186 The Muslim can read in the Koran that “surely
God has power over all things.”187 The Hindu scriptures say of the Hindu divinity
that, “the whole universe is ever in his power.”188 Ohio’s motto is even similar to the
words of the ancient Greek philosopher Homer, who wrote in The Odyssey, “To the
gods all things are possible,”189 as well as to Sophocles in Ajax, who wrote, “When a
god works, all is possible.”190 From these few examples, it is clear that the idea
behind the phrase “With God All Things Are Possible” is not unique to Christianity
alone and the use of such a motto by the State of Ohio does not constitute an
excessive entanglement of the government with Christian theology.
In recent years, federal courts have upheld the use of many religious symbols,
phrases and activities that seem to carry a far greater risk of entanglement than that
which could be perceived to come out of the Ohio state motto.191 As has been
previously discussed, the actions of the framers and of modern legislatures and
courts show that the Establishment Clause does not require that all references to
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religion be stripped from the affairs of government and that general references to
God, such as found in the Ohio state motto, do not constitute an excessive
entanglement between the government and religion. For these reasons, whether the
Lemon test is abandoned or not, the Ohio motto does not violate the three-part Lemon
test.
C. The Ambiguous “Reasonable Observer” of the Endorsement Test
Ohio’s motto also withstands the endorsement test even though the test is
vulnerable to observer bias and is ambiguous in definition. As such, it should also be
abandoned. As stated previously, under this test, the standard for assessing whether a
government practice endorses religion is whether “the reasonable observer” would
view the practice as an endorsement.192 This begs the question: Who is the
reasonable observer? Justice O’Connor tried to answer this question in Pinette:
[T]he applicable observer is similar to the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law,
who ‘is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might
occasionally do unreasonable things,’ but is ‘rather a personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective]
social judgment.’ . . . [T]he reasonable observer in the endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the
community and forum in which the religious display appears.193
This definition of a fictitious objective observer “falsely assumes that there is a
single impartial perspective from which to judge whether government has ‘endorsed’
religion.”194 Does someone who is the “personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior” share the predominant religious sensibilities of his or her
community or hold to a minority view? Is this mystery person religious, agnostic,
separationist, or nonpreferentialist? In a nation that is as religiously diverse as the
United States, there is no uniform perspective from those who are “outside” or
“inside” religion.195 In the end, the only perceptions that count seems to be those of
the judges.196 Some have gone so far as to say that the endorsement test is merely a
“cloaking device” to “obscur[e] intuitive judgments made from the individual
judge’s own personal perspective.”197 Such an ambiguous measurement for a
violation of the Establishment Clause is not reliable and should be abandoned.
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D. The Ohio State Motto Under the Endorsement Test
Although the endorsement test has met with much criticism,198 it is still used by
many courts today and has been applied to the Ohio state motto.199 Ohio’s motto does
not violate the endorsement test. As has been discussed above, the relevant question
is whether “the reasonable observer” would view the Ohio state motto as an
endorsement. The ACLU claims that the reasonable, informed observer would see
Ohio’s state motto as an endorsement of religion because such an observer “would
know . . . that the Ohio motto consists of the words of Jesus Christ as quoted in the
Gospel of Matthew” and that these words purportedly refer to “the salvation of
souls.”200
This statement makes two claims. First, that words or concepts that appear in the
Bible or that are the words of Jesus Christ are “off limits” to the government, even if
(as in this case) the words or concepts appear in multiple religious and non-religious
texts. This claim presupposes that the words of the motto retain the same meaning
that they had 2,000 years ago when they were spoken by Jesus Christ, although
removed from their original context and put into a new one. Second, the claim is
that the words of the Ohio state motto actually do refer solely to “the salvation of
souls.” There are problems with each of these claims.
Words or concepts that appear in the Bible, whether spoken by Jesus Christ or
not, are not banned from use by public officials in the public arena. Again, the
historical and modern use of Biblical words and concepts in many facets of the
government cries out against this claim.201 As brought out by the district court,
“[m]any aphorisms which are part of our common vocabulary have their origin in the
Hebrew Bible or the Christian New Testament.”202 If words found in the Bible or
spoken by Jesus Christ were truly banned from use in the public sector, then
innumerable changes would have to be made in our government. Historically
accepted, governmental acknowledgments of God such as our national motto, based
on passages from the Psalms, would have to be struck down as unconstitutional.
Also, familiar sayings and proverbs such as the golden rule, “Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you,”203 and “Love your neighbor as yourself”204 could
never be held up by government officials as ideals worthy of following. Such a
drastic step was never the intention of the framers and is surely not the practice of
our government today.
The context of the Ohio state motto does not constitute an endorsement of
religion. While it is true that the Supreme Court has consistently found that “the
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meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
context in which it is used,”205 it is not necessarily true that the meaning of words or
phrases must be drawn from their original context. Once the words “With God All
Things Are Possible” were removed from the gospel of Matthew and codified as the
Ohio state motto in Ohio Rev. Code § 5.06 alongside other state symbols such as the
Ohio state flower206 and the state bird,207 and once those words were placed under the
seal of the state of Ohio and displayed on various forms and buildings, they obtain a
new context from which to draw their meaning. As the district court writes
“[r]emoved from their Christian New Testament context, the words of the motto do
not suggest a denominational preference.”208 Neither do they “state a principle
unique to Christianity.”209
The Ohio motto, like other statements used by the government, potentially
operates on two levels.210 For example, the words of Jesus found in John 8:32, “Ye
shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free,” adorn the Ohio State University
College of Law and also serve as the motto for the United States Central Intelligence
Agency [hereinafter “CIA”].211 A brief glimpse into other passages of the Bible
reveal what Jesus originally meant when he spoke of “the truth” and being “set free.”
Later in the same gospel, Jesus makes another statement about truth: “I am the way,
the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through Me.”212 And the
apostle Paul said in Romans 6:22 that to be “set free” means that being “set free from
sin . . . you have . . . everlasting life.”
From these passages it can be deduced that when Jesus was speaking of “the
truth” he was really speaking of himself, and the freedom of which he spoke was the
freedom from the bondage of sin unto salvation. On one level, the phrase, “Ye shall
know the truth and the truth shall set you free,” speaks directly to the salvation of
souls through Jesus Christ. On another level, and in the new context of being
associated with the study of law at Ohio State or the enforcement of law at the CIA,
the phrase speaks to the secular purpose of “advocating the liberating pursuit of truth
(whether religious or not) in the practice [and enforcement] of law.”213 It is obvious
to the “reasonable observer” that the motto of the CIA is not meant to convey the
message of salvation through Jesus Christ because it is not the purpose of the CIA to
proclaim that message. Rather, the reasonable and informed observer would know
that the job of the CIA is to search for and find the truth in its investigations so that
justice might be served and America’s freedoms protected. With this knowledge, the
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reasonable observer would know that despite the phrase’s source and original
meaning, it obtains a new meaning in its new context.
This leads to the ACLU’s second claim: that Ohio’s motto refers solely to “the
salvation of souls.” Just as the CIA’s motto, “Ye shall know the truth and the truth
shall set you free,” works on two levels, so does the Ohio state motto, “With God All
Things Are Possible.” The court of appeals in Ohio’s motto case held that they were
“required to view the words of the motto as part of the text in which they are found
and give them . . . the meaning intended by Jesus when he addressed his disciples as
reported by Matthew in the New Testament of the Christian Bible.”214 The court,
claiming to come at this issue with strict neutrality, took on the very “un-neutral”
role of Biblical interpreter and found that the words of the motto speak to salvation
and show a “particular affinity” for Christianity.215 James Madison spoke to such
actions by the court when he said that any notion that “the Civil Magistrate is a
competent Judge of Religious Truth” is an “arrogant pretension falsified by the
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world.”216 The issue
of whether courts should be involved in Biblical interpretation aside, the court is
only partly correct in its conclusions. The words “With God All Things Are
Possible” were indeed used to answer the question, “[w]ho then can be saved,”217
posed by the disciples after Jesus had told them how difficult it is for a rich man to
enter the kingdom of heaven.218 However, the “reasonable observer” can plainly see
that the statement is not limited only to salvation. The phrase does not say “With
God Salvation Is Possible,” but rather “With God All Things Are Possible.” “All
things” does indeed include salvation, but it must, by definition, include everything
else. “All things” can arguably include secular goals such as balancing the budget,
ending domestic violence, or breaking down organized crime and drug trafficking
rings; the heavy tasks of the state that seem impossible to man. Even in its original
context, Ohio’s motto does not speak to how a man is to be saved but only that such
salvation is possible. According to the Christian faith, a soul can only be saved by
grace, through faith in Jesus Christ and His propitiatory work on the cross.219 The
reasonable observer “aware of the history and context of the community and forum
in which the [motto] appears”220 would understand these things and accept the Ohio
state motto as a constitutional acknowledgment of God that inculcates a message of
hope as citizens face the seemingly impossible tasks of State government. For these
reasons, the Ohio state motto does not violate the endorsement test.
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E. A Return to the Supreme Court’s Original Test: The Coercion Analysis
Although the Ohio state motto passes both the Lemon test and the endorsement
test, these tests are so flawed, ambiguous, and cumbersome that they should be
abandoned in this inquiry in favor of the Supreme Court’s original tool in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: the coercion test. As stated above, the Supreme
Court began its Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Everson v. Board of
Education in which the coercion analysis was developed.221 As stated by Justice
Kennedy, “the Establishment Clause contains two limiting principles: government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it
may not . . . give direct benefits to a religion in such a degree that it in fact
establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”222 The coercion
analysis is linked to the framers’ original resolve against any type of state church
which would rule with an iron fist over its citizens. The coercion analysis is also
easier to apply to the wide variety of Establishment cases than the cumbersome
Lemon test and the ambiguous endorsement test. A “coercion” by the state takes
place where there is a real threat of harm if there is not an act of compliance by the
citizen.223 For these reasons, the coercion test should be used to analyze whether the
Ohio state motto constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.
F. The Ohio State Motto Under the Coercion Analysis
The Ohio motto does not “coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion
or its exercise,” but merely makes a statement about God in a generalized, respectful
and historically constitutional way.224 It is as constitutional as the national motto,
which not only mentions “God” but makes a statement about how we, as Americans,
are to relate to Him. Use of the Ohio state motto does not amount to a coercion
because it demands no act of compliance from which a citizen might experience a
real threat of harm.225 Ohio’s state motto does not punish citizens of Ohio “for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance.”226 Ohio’s motto does not establish a state religion or even uphold
the Christian religion above others. As has been shown the words of the Ohio state
motto comply with the world’s major religions and fall under the category of a
constitutionally accepted, generalized, reference to God. For all of these reasons,
Ohio’s state motto is found to be constitutional under the coercion analysis. It has
been shown that the Ohio state motto stands up under the skewed scrutiny of the
Lemon and endorsement tests even though the flaws in these tests call for their
abandonment. In light of this, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should turn
to the coercion analysis, the original test used by the Supreme Court, the test
supported by the history and jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, and reverse
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their decision to find the Ohio state motto constitutional under the Establishment
Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
Although over two hundred years old, the Establishment Clause continues to be a
hot bed of debate today. The discussion above has only given a brief glimpse into
some of the arguments that rage over its history, interpretation, and application. But
no matter what agreement can be found in relation to the Establishment Clause, a
constitutional standard will never be derived that eliminates religious strife from
political life. However, this is not necessarily a “bad” thing. As Madison saw it,
“division and opposition among multiple religious sects would make overbearing
majorities unlikely.”227 And protection from an “overbearing [religious] majority” is
something about which all interpreters of the Establishment Clause agree. All
reference to religion and God need not be banned in fear of a state-church. That was
not the intention of the framers and that is not the practice today. As the Supreme
Court stated in Lynch,228 “our history is replete with official references to the value
and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.”229 The Ohio State motto, “With God
All Things are Possible” is one such historically accepted, embraced, and
constitutional acknowledgment of the Divine.
VI. EPILOGUE
Since this paper was written, the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a nine to
four decision, affirmed the judgment of the District Court and concluded that the
Ohio state motto does not violate the Establishment Clause.230
The court reached this decision by acknowledging that, historically speaking,
“the prohibition against enactment of laws establishing religion or paving the way
for an establishment of religion was not understood to be a prohibition against
fostering or protecting religion, nor was it understood to be a prohibition against
employing generalized religious language in official discourse.”231 Citing many
historical figures, events and cases, the Court acknowledged that the Ohio motto
does not constitute an establishment of religion as the original framers understood
the First Amendment.232
The Court further acknowledged that “coercion” was a central element to the
original understanding of an establishment of religion.233 In light of this fact, the
Court began with a coercion analysis and found that the Ohio “motto involves no
coercion.”234 Rather, they found the motto to be “merely a broadly worded
227
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expression of a religious/philosophical sentiment that happens to be widely shared by
the citizens of Ohio.”235
The Court went on to analyze the Ohio motto through the eye of the “reasonable
observer” of the endorsement test.236 The Court found “that no well-informed
observer could reasonably take Ohio’s motto to be an official endorsement of the
Christian religion.”237 This conclusion arose from the Court’s acknowledgment that a
well-informed observer would be aware, from sentiments similar to Ohio’s motto
found in other historical, religious and secular contexts, that there is “nothing
uniquely Christian about the thought that all things are possible with God.”238
Finally, the Court turned its attention to Lemon and concluded that “Ohio’s motto
easily passes the Lemon test.”239 The Court found that because “the company in
which Ohio Rev. Code § 5.06 finds itself tends to undermine the thesis that § 5.06
somehow represents a first step in the direction of ‘an establishment of religion’” and
because “the government’s assertion of a legitimate secular purpose is entitled to
deference,”240 the statute adopting the Ohio motto has a secular purpose and meets
the first prong of the Lemon test.241 The Court felt that Ohio’s motto met the second
prong of the Lemon test and held that the motto does not have the primary purpose or
the primary effect of advancing religion.242 The Court stated that they “do not believe
that a state advances religion impermissibly by adopting a motto that provides no
financial relief to any church but pays lip service to the puissance of God.”243 The
Court also felt that because “[t]he primary effect of the national motto is not to
advance religion, …it clearly follows that the primary effect of the state motto is not
to advance religion either.”244 Finally, the Court found that the Ohio motto passed
the third prong of the Lemon test by acknowledging that no institutional
entanglement with the government is evident.245
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal’s emphasis of coercion as a “central element”
to the original understanding of the Establishment Clause, coupled with their use of
the coercion analysis as the first test in determining whether Ohio’s motto violates
the Establishment Clause, are evidence of the movement toward revitalization of the
original coercion analysis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While the coercion
analysis alone could have justified the Court’s findings, because of past reliance on
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the flawed endorsement and Lemon tests, this Court was wise to justify the Ohio
motto under these tests as well. The Court, basing their decision on logic, history,
and jurisprudence, rightly held that Ohio’s state motto does not violate the
Establishment Clause but rather constitutes a historically accepted and constitutional
acknowledgment of the Divine.
CHRISTOPHER PIERRE
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